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COLORADO CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY V WEA VER:
THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S IMPROPER REDEFINITION
OF "EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT"
James T. Koebel+
The relationship between government and religion stands as one of the most
contentious issues in America. l Religion in publicly-funded schools has been
described as "one of the most controversial issues in American education."2
The First Amendment's Establishment Clause operates as the vehicle for
+ J.D. and Securities and Corporate Law Certificate Candidate, May 2010, The Catholic
University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A., University of Maryland, Baltimore
County, 2006. The author wishes to thank Karl F. Brevitz for his expert insight.
1. See Richard W. Gamett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J.
1667, 1668-70 (2006). Government and religion have tangled in courts over issues ranging from
the posting of the Ten Commandments in courthouses to prayer in public schools. See id. at
1668-69; see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422-25 (1962). The proper role of religion as it
pertains to government in America has been debated since our nation's inception. See Roger
Finke & Rodney Stark, The Churching of America, in RELIGION: NORTHERN AMERICAN STYLE
43, 47-49, (Thomas E. Dowdy & Patrick H. McNamara eds., 1997). See generally CLIFTON E.
OLMSTEAD, HISTORY OF RELIGION IN THE UNITED STATES 2-3 (1960) (discussing the "constant
competition" between church and state); Geoffrey R. Stone, The World of the Framers: A
Christian Nation?, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1, 6-24 (2008) (detailing religious beliefs of our nation's
principal founders). In fact, colonial rebellion found its roots in the oppression of religious
freedom imposed by England and its national church, the Church of England. Id. at 58-60.
Today, we are "increasingly, a nation divided by God," who "vote as we pray, or don't pray."
Gamett, supra, at 1677 (internal citations omitted).
2. See SUSAN D. LOONEY, EDUCATION AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A GUIDE TO
UNDERSTANDING THE LAW 53 (2004); see also George W. Dent, Jr., Secularism and the Supreme
Court, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1, 61-62 ("Nowhere is the role of religion as controversial as in public
education."); Kent Greenawalt, Teaching About Religion in the Public Schools, 18 J.L. & POL.
329, 329-30 (2002) (stating that prayer in schools was the subject of "[t]wo of the twentieth
century's most controversial Supreme Court decisions"); Steven D. Smith, Unprincipled
Religious Freedom, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 497, 509 (1996) (describing public aid to
parochial schools as the most important issue in church-state relations). Religion in schools has
taken many forms, including religious observances, the debate over teaching evolution or
creationism, reciting the Pledge of Allegiance, public aid to parochial schools, and government
scholarship moneys directed to religiously affiliated universities. See, e.g., Daniel L. Dreisbach,
Everson and the Command of History: The Supreme Court, Lessons of History, and Church-State
Debate in America, in EVERSON REVISITED: RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND LAW AT THE
CROSSROADS 23-44 (Jo Renee Formicola & Hubert Morken eds., 1997) (discussing the
importance and aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision regarding indirect aid to private
schools in Everson v. Board of Education); MICHAEL IMBER & TYLL VAN GEEL, EDUCATION
LAW 61-94 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing limits on the states' power to control public schools);
David H. McClamrock, Note, The First Amendment and Public Funding of Religiously
Controlled or Affiliated Higher Education, 17 J.C. & U.L. 381, 381-83 (1991) (discussing
government funding at religious institutions).
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courts to effect the separation of church and state.3 As higher education costs
continue to increase, students in private and public universities alike rely on
state-funded scholarships to meet tuition needs.4 The Establishment Clause,
however, is an obstacle for many students attending private universities, as it
can severely restrict state funding for religious education. 5 When interpreting
the Clause, some states use a blanket-rule approach based on the institution's
degree of religiosity to either permit or deny funding, while other states weigh
certain criteria to make a determination.
6
To remedy this discrepancy, states need a uniform standard to gauge each
institution's level of involvement in advancing or inhibiting religion in order to
avoid an Establishment Clause violation. An inquiry into a particular
institution's religious affiliation is necessary to achieve this legitimate state
objective. Such an inquiry serves to assure neutrality with respect to
government action toward religion. 7 The United States Court of Appeals for
3. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 3, 15-16 (1947). The Supreme Court listed the
following parameters of the Establishment Clause:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither
can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will
or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished
for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or
non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they
adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and
vice versa.
1d; see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005) (considering whether a Ten
Commandments monument on the Texas State Capitol grounds violated the Establishment
Clause); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606-07 (1971) (considering whether public funds to
parochial schools violated the Establishment Clause).
4. See Commonfund, 2008 Higher Education Price Index Update, http://www.common
fund.org/Commonfund/CF+Institute/CI_AboutHEPI.htm (follow "HEPI 2008 Table" hyperlink)
(last visited Aug. 4, 2009); National Center for Education Statistics, Fast Facts, http://nces.ed.
gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=76 (last visited Aug. 4, 2009).
5. See, e.g., Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772-74
(1973) (describing the three-part test that the Establishment Clause requires); see also Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943) (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment renders the First
Amendment applicable to the states).
6. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1009.992(13), 1011.51 (West 2008) (excluding outright
institutions deemed "pervasively sectarian" from state scholarship and endowment eligibility),
with Cal. Statewide Cmtys. Dev. Auth. v. Purchase Agreement, 152 P.3d 1070, 1079 (Cal. 2007)
(holding that California courts should "examine the substance of the education" provided by
religious schools rather than their characterization as "pervasively sectarian"), Va. Coll. Bldg.
Auth. v. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d 682, 689-91 (Va. 2000) (explaining that although one department of
an institution was pervasively sectarian, its participation in the bond program did not violate the
Establishment Clause), and Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999) (holding that the tax
credit does not violate either the state or federal constitution).
7. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000) (stating that a relevant
question in determining state sponsorship of religion is whether an outside observer, familiar with
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the Tenth Circuit's recent decision in Colorado Christian University v. Weaver
threatens to eliminate this type of inquiry, holding that these inquiries
constitute an impermissible degree of involvement with religion. 8  By
eliminating this inquiry, however, a state also loses its assurance of neutrality.
This Note focuses on the inquiry the state of Colorado used in evaluating
whether an institution of higher education was "pervasively sectarian," and the
Tenth Circuit's determination that such inquiry was excessive government
entanglement with religion. 9 The concept of "excessive entanglement" was
crafted as a tool that courts could use to analyze Establishment Clause issues,
and as a guide that states could use to avoid Establishment Clause violations.
10
The extension of that concept to include the "pervasively sectarian" inquiry
ignores precedent and leaves states without an effective guide with which to
judge their compliance with the Establishment Clause.
11
The Establishment Clause prohibits Congress from making laws respecting
the establishment of religion. It has been applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, and has been interpreted to mean that no state shall
act to advance or prevent an establishment of religion. 14 The Supreme Court
created a three-pronged test, commonly known as the Lemon test, for use in
determining whether government action is proper under the Establishment
Clause.15 Government action is permissible if it: (1) reflects a secular purpose;
(2) has the primary effect of "neither advance[ing] nor inhibitling] religion";
and (3) does not result in excessive entanglement with religion.'
The Lemon test was developed in response to a variety of challenged state
government aid programs that benefitted religiously affiliated schools and the
the statute at issue, would perceive the religious activity as state-sponsored); Everson, 330 U.S. at
14 (describing the difficulty in state courts' efforts to separate religion and government in
determining whether tax legislation has the effect of aiding religion or the general public).
8. Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1261-62 (10th Cir. 2008); see also
Court Ruling is Victory for Religious Colleges, USATODAY.com, Jul. 24, 2008, http://www.usa
today.com/news/education/2008-07-24-religious-collegesN.htm ("The bottom line is that
taxpayers will now end up having to pay for religious indoctrination .... ").
9. Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1250 (describing the criteria used in that inquiry as
being an "intrusive scrutiny of religious belief and practice").
10. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-14 (1971) (explaining that the concept of
"excessive entanglement" indicates a nexus between church and state as well as an impermissible
level of involvement between the two); Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 674-75
(1970) (describing the test for determining if there is excessive entanglement as "inescapably one
of degree").
11. Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1253 (framing the question as whether or not the state
may choose to "exclude pervasively sectarian institutions ... even when not required to").
12. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
13. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215-16 (1963) (citing
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)).
14. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
15. Id. at612-13.
16. Id.
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students attending them. 17 Often, these decisions hinged on the application of
the test's excessive entanglement prong.' 8  Excessive entanglement is
frequently found in circumstances in which schools are subjected to extensive
government oversight.' 9 In response to the states' need for a finer standard
with regard to this prong, the Supreme Court has held that providing direct aid
to "pervasively sectarian" institutions is tantamount to excessive government
entanglement with religion. The term "pervasively sectarian" has been
authoritatively defined to include instances where an institution is "so
permeated by religion that the secular side cannot be separated from the
sectarian. ' 21  In assigning this label, the state inquires into an institution's
educational and religious purposes, objectives, and functions to determine the
22degree to which religion permeates the institution.
17. Id. at 606-07 (describing Pennsylvania and Rhode Island aid programs that reimburse
teachers' salaries and the cost of textbooks and other materials at religiously affiliated schools);
Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. I v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 238-39 (1968) (considering a New
York aid program that required school districts to loan textbooks to students attending parochial
schools); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 3-5 (1947) (considering a New Jersey program
that provided transportation for students attending parochial schools).
18. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619-22 (determining that the degree of surveillance required to
administer the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island reimbursement aid programs created an
excessively entangled relationship between government and religion); see also Walz v. Tax
Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970) (stating that the purpose of the religion clauses of the
First Amendment is to create "boundaries to avoid excessive entanglement").
19. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 240-41, 243 (1977) ("Similarly, the inability
of the school to control the test eliminates the need for the supervision that gives rise to excessive
entanglement.").
20. See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 746 (1973). The Court reasoned that "the degree of
entanglement arising from inspection of facilities as to use varies in large measure with the extent
to which religion permeates the institution." Id. The Court, in Roemer v. Board of Public Works,
further explained that the need for close monitoring increases with the degree to which an
institution is sectarian, because pervasively sectarian institutions necessarily are fraught with
excessive entanglement problems. 426 U.S. 736, 762 (1976) (noting that the opposite is true for
secular activities and institutions).
21. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 759. The Colorado Supreme Court has characterized pervasively
sectarian schools as
those "[w]here religious indoctrination is [] a substantial purpose," those "whose
educational function is not clearly separable from its religious mission," and those
"whose religious mission predominates over its secular educational role. By contrast, it
described sectarian schools whose students could constitutionally receive tuition
assistance as those whose "secular function can readily be severed from its sectarian
activity."
Colo. Christian Univ. v. Baker, No. 04-cv-02512-MSK-BNB, 2007 WL 1489801, at *6 (D. Colo.
May 18, 2007) (quoting Ams. United for Separation of Church and State Fund, Inc. v. Colorado,
648 P.2d 1072, 1080-82 (Colo. 1982)) (alterations in original).
22. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 384-85 (1985) (finding that
the character of religious schools receiving aid was pervasively sectarian); Hunt, 413 U.S. at 743-
44; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686-87 (1971) (weighing evidence provided by school
that theology courses did not indoctrinate students in determining whether religion permeated the
institution); Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1261-62 (10th Cir. 2008)
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The Supreme Court has since refined its Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, holding that a state may provide aid in the form of educational
materials for students attending pervasively sectarian institutions. 23  This
holding, however, has left some ambiguity z4 with respect to what level of
government support is required and what is merely permitted2 5  In other
words, although a state is not prohibited from including pervasively sectarian
institutions in its scholarship programs, it is unclear whether a state may
actively choose to exclude them.26 Some circuit courts have joined this debate,
questioning the constitutionality of the "pervasively sectarian" distinction.
27
This trend began with the Supreme Court holding that the Establishment
Clause does not require pervasively sectarian schools to be excluded from
otherwise permissible aid programs.
(considering state higher education commission's inquiry as to degree of sectarian character of
university for the purpose of determining qualification under state scholarship statute).
23. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 801-03, 829 (2000) (discussing a program that
provided funds for educational materials through a lending system).
24. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
25. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718-21 (2004). The "play in the joints" referenced
are those "state actions [that are] permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required by the
Free Exercise Clause." Id. at 718-19; see also David Saperstein, Public Accountability and
Faith-Based Organizations: A Problem Best Avoided, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1353, 1355 (2003)
(hypothesizing that a religious organization could receive government funding without violating
the Establishment Clause but could also refuse to disclose financial records pursuant to the
protections of the Free Exercise Clause). The Court described these clauses as "frequently in
tension," and reiterated that the state of interplay under Establishment Clause jurisprudence is
"the [impermissible] link between government funds and religious training [that] is broken by the
independent and private choice of recipients." Locke, 540 U.S. at 718-19. It then presented the
issue of whether the state of Washington, pursuant to its constitution's prohibitions on even
indirect funding of religious and ministerial instruction, could deny the scholarship without
violating the Free Exercise Clause, despite being able to grant the funds under the Establishment
Clause. Id. The Court reasoned that because this form of religious discrimination was "of a far
milder kind" than had previously been at issue, it was not presumptively unconstitutional and
should be examined under the rational basis test. Id. at 720-21 & n.3; see also infra note 167.
But cf Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 524, 526-27,
546-47 (1993) (applying strict scrutiny to a non-neutral statute that imposed criminal sanctions
on practice of religion through animal sacrifice).
26. See Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1253. ("It is therefore undisputed that federal
law does not require Colorado to discriminate against Colorado Christian University in its
funding programs. Rather, the parties' dispute centers on whether the State may nonetheless
choose to exclude pervasively sectarian institutions, as defined by Colorado law, even when not
required to. We conclude that it may not.").
27. See Ams. United for Separation of Church and State v. Fellowship Ministries, Inc., 509
F.3d 406, 414 n.2, 424-25 (8th Cir. 2007); Johnson v. Econ. Dev. Corp. of Oakland, 241 F.3d
501, 510 n.2 (6th Cit. 2001); Columbia Union Coll. v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 46 F.3d 1449,
1461 (9th Cir. 1995).
28. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 829. The Court stated:
[T]he inquiry into the recipient's religious views required by a focus on whether a
school is pervasively sectarian is not only unnecessary but also offensive. . . . In
addition, and related, the application of the "pervasively sectarian" factor collides with
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The most recent consideration given to this question involved Colorado
statutes providing scholarships only to students attending accredited
institutions of higher education that were deemed not pervasively sectarian.29
Colorado Christian University (CCU) was deemed ineligible to participate in
the program following the state's determination that it was pervasively
sectarian. 30  CCU challenged the statutes' constitutionality under the First
Amendment's Religion Clauses.3' The district court ruled against the school
and upheld the statutes. 32 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that the relevant portions of the statutes
were unconstitutional, and that the Commission's inquiry into whether CCU
was pervasively sectarian was, in itself, excessive government entanglement
with religion.33 The Tenth Circuit's holding, however, departs from the logic
of its predecessors and is without the necessary clarification to guide states in
their efforts to abide by the Establishment Clause.
This Note addresses the Lemon test's "excessive entanglement" prong in the
context of the Tenth Circuit's declaration that the "pervasively sectarian" test,
as applied in Colorado Christian University v. Weaver, is unconstitutional.
This Note begins by tracing the development of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, with exclusive regard to government aid to schools and the
development of the "pervasively sectarian" distinction. Second, this Note
examines the "excessive entanglement" prong of the Lemon test. Third, this
Note analyzes the development under the Supreme Court's plurality opinion in
Mitchell v. Helms, which called into question the "pervasively sectarian"
distinction. Lastly, this Note discusses the ramifications of disregarding
precedent and declaring the "pervasively sectarian" inquiry used by the state of
Colorado to be excessive entanglement. This Note argues that, despite a great
our decisions that have prohibited governments from discriminating in the distribution
of public benefits based upon religious status or sincerity.... Finally, hostility to aid to
pervasively sectarian schools has a shameful pedigree that we do not hesitate to
disavow.
Id. at 828.
29. Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1250.
30. Id at 1252-53.
31. Id. at 1253. The university also challenged the action under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. That challenge, however, is not relevant to this Note.
32. See Colo. Christian Univ. v. Baker, No. 04-cv-02512-MSK-BNB, 2007 WL 1489801, at
*15 (D. Colo. May 18, 2007). CCU did not challenge the commission's finding that it was
pervasively sectarian based on the statutory test. Id. at *2. CCU specifically contended that
exclusion of pervasively sectarian institutions from the scholarship programs violated the Free
Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at * 1. The court
reasoned that because the statute was narrowly tailored to accomplish the state's compelling
interest in complying with Colorado's constitutional establishment requirements, Colorado was
entitled to summary judgment. Id. at * 14-15; see also infra note 167 (discussing district court's
holding).
33. Colo. Christian Univ.. 534 F.3d at 1261.
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need, this approach lacks a standard and leaves states with no way to gauge
their compliance with the Establishment Clause.
I. THE TURBID DEVELOPMENT OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Initial Interpretations through Lemon v. Kurtzman
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .... 34 Original
35sources help shed light on its meaning and the purpose it was meant to serve.
Thomas Jefferson wrote that the clause "thus buil[t] a wall of separation
between Church and State." 36  James Madison stressed the principle that
"equality of all religious sects [is] in the eve of the Constitution." 37 Insightful
as they are, these maxims have done little to quell controversy. 38 The Supreme
Court has since strived to reconcile two extremes of interpretation: absolute
separation of government from religion and absolute government neutrality
toward religion.39 The result is the widely agreed upon principle of neutral
treatment of religions, without the advancement or inhibition thereof.40  The
application of this doctrine, however, has been the source of an evolving bodyof cnfusng ad •41
of confusing and contradictory jurisprudence.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
35. See Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About
Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875, 879-99 (1987) (detailing and analyzing text of
drafts of the Clause and Congressional debates); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 609-31
(1992) (Souter, J., concurring) (detailing the Establishment Clause's textual development); Robert
L. Cord & Howard Ball, The Separation of Church and State: A Debate, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 895,
896-99, 910 (analyzing the historical basis for the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Establishment Clause); Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 398-412 (2002) (analyzing ideas of debates over separation of church and
state during the nation's founding); Vincent Phillip Munoz, The Original Meaning of the
Establishment Clause and the Impossibility of Its Incorporation, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 585, 588-
604 (2006) (analyzing the original meaning of the Establishment Clause).
36. See WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 281-82 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903).
37. See Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 5 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 105 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). Madison
continued to lament the "corrupting influence" of a "coalition between [Government and]
Religion," noting that "the danger cannot be too carefully guarded [against]." Id.
38. See infra note 41 (discussing cases addressing the controversial issues arising out of the
Establishment Clause).
39. See McClamrock, supra note 2, at 383-86 (arguing that neither extreme is a proper
interpretation).
40. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (stating that the Establishment
Clause commands that there be "no law respecting an establishment of religion").
41. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 816 (2000) (establishing the rule that "neutrally
available" aid passing through the hands of private citizens who freely direct it to religious
institutions does not violate the Establishment Clause); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788-89, 798 (1973) (establishing the rule that the
Establishment Clause dictates that the primary effect of laws must neither advance nor inhibit
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As such, the Court has been faced with a need to devise workable tests for
governments that provide aid to religious institutions or to students attending
those institutions, in order to evaluate the dictates of the Establishment
42Clause. The first test originated in School District of Abingdon v. Schempp,
reasoning that the Establishment Clause cannot require an absolute separation
of church and state.43 The Court set forth a test for determining impermissible
government aid: "there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
' 44
This test, however, proved to be inadequate as the Supreme Court began to
hear increasingly complex issues. 45 In Walz v. Tax Commission of New York,
the Court recognized that some room for the accommodation of neutrally-
46
granted government aid may exist without advancing or inhibiting religion.
The Court considered a city property tax exemption that extended to religious
organizations for properties used exclusively for worship.47 The Court held
religion); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (establishing the rule that the
Establishment Clause mandates that no law result in "excessive government entanglement with
religion"); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (establishing the rule that the
Establishment Clause requires that no tax can support an institution's religious activities); Colo.
Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1253 (10th Cir. 2008) (establishing the rule that state
aid may be directed to pervasively sectarian institutions under the Establishment Clause).
42. See, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615 (briefly describing the three-prong test for determining
excessive entanglement); Walz, 397 U.S. at 674-75 (devising the test of whether a law results in
"excessive government entanglement with religion"); Sch. Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (devising a test analyzing whether a law has a secular legislative purpose
and whether the primary effect of the law advances or inhibits religion).
43. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222.
44. Id. at 220-22 (internal citations omitted). The Court distinguished the separation
required under the Establishment Clause of the state and an actual establishment of religion with
that of the state and all aspects of a church. Id. at 219-22. To this extent, complete separation is
required between an establishment and the state; however, only "concert or union or dependency"
is prohibited between a church and the state. Id. at 219-20 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306, 312 (1952)); see also Douglas C. Shimonek, Using the Lemon Test as Camouflage:
Avoiding the Establishment Clause, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 835, 841-42 (1990) (describing
"[s]ecular [1]egislative [p]urpose" as referring to the motive behind a law, which must be secular,
although not necessarily wholly unrelated to religion, and "[p]rimary [e]ffect" as referring to the
government itself advancing religion through its own actions).
45. See, e.g., Walz, 397 U.S. at 666-67 (considering whether a New York law creating a tax
exemption for churches violated the Establishment Clause).
46. Id. at 669. The Supreme Court extracted from the First Amendment's Religion Clauses
the general principle that neither a governmentally established religion nor governmental
interference with religion is permissible. Id. Chief Justice Burger wrote that "[s]hort of those
expressly proscribed governmental acts there is room for play in the joints productive of a
benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and
without interference." Id The Court went on to explain that the very existence of the Religion
Clauses is proof of constant state involvement with religion and that absolute separation is
impossible. Id. at 670. The Supreme Court's analysis of the Religion Clauses, therefore,
establishes a gauge by which governments may avoid excessive entanglement. Id. at 668-70; see
also Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614-15; Zorach, 343 U.S. at 312.
47. Walz, 397 U.S. at 666-67.
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that the exemption neither advanced nor inhibited religion. 48  The Court
determined that judgments of this sort must turn on the degree of government
entanglement with religion.49 A "minimal and remote" degree of entanglement
would be permissible, whereas an "excessive" degree would render the aid
impermissible.
50
The Supreme Court settled on a uniform Establishment Clause test in Lemon
v. Kurtzman.5 1 At issue were two state programs granting aid to nonpublic
schools.52 One program, under a Rhode Island statute, provided supplemental
salaries for teachers in nonpublic elementary schools who taught secular
subjects.5 3 The other program, under a Pennsylvania statute, provided
reimbursement for school supplies used in the teaching of secular subjects in
54nonpublic schools. Relying on "cumulative criteria developed.., over many
years, 55 the Court combined its previous tests into a single, three-prong test
for use in Establishment Clause cases. 56  With regard to the third prong-
excessive entanglement-the Court explained that it was necessary to examine
"the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of
the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the
government and the religious authority. 57
In applying the test, the Court found that both aid programs at issue were
impermissible. 58 Relying on the schools' substantial religious character, the
Court determined that the resulting relationship would be excessively
48. Id. at 672-73 (reasoning that the tax exemption applied to a wide variety of properties,
including those owned by non-religious nonprofits as well as churches, all of which benefit the
community and are in the public interest).
49. Id at 674.
50. Id. at 674-76.
51. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
52. Id. at 606.
53. Id. at 607.
54. Id at 609-10.
55. Id. at 612; see also Walz, 397 U.S. at 674-75 (developing a result-based test analyzing
whether a law results in "excessive government entanglement with religion"); Sch. Dist. of
Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (devising a test that analyzes whether a law has
a secular legislative purpose and whether the primary effect of the law advances or inhibits
religion).
56. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615. Additionally, the Court explained the proper application of the
prongs of the Lemon test. Id. at 612-13. Examining the statutory language and legislative intent
of both statutes to determine the purpose, the Court concluded that both were permissibly secular.
Id. at 613. The Court explained that the statutory provisions, which operated as legislative
precautions against offending the Religion Clauses, would be relevant in determining primary
effect. Id. at 613-14. The Court refrained from actually applying these factors in light of the
statutes' violation of the excessive entanglement prong. Id.; see also Walz, 397 U.S. at 667-68
(explaining that the three main evils protected against by the Establishment Clause are
sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement in religious activity).
57. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
58. Id. at617-22.
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entangled,59 requiring continued state surveillance of the teachers to ensure that
no indoctrination occurred.60 The Court further determined that the required
auditing of expenditures for secular and religious education was itself
excessively entangling.
6 1
Moreover, the Pennsylvania statutory scheme provided that the aid was to be
dispersed directly to the religious schools. 62 The Court reasoned that this
characteristic distinguished it from other permissible aid programs, in that
direct money subsidies historically indicate an excessively entangled church-
state relationship. 63 This distinction became a workable standard that anchored
Supreme Court Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
64
B. Burgeoning School Aid Cases and Early Attempts to Create a Standard
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, beginning with the Lemon decision,
revolved around a set of fairly consistent principles. 65 The Supreme Court then
began to distinguish aid directed toward students from aid directed at schools,
with the distinction becoming largely outcome determinative.
66
1. Impermissible Direct-to-School Aid Programs
The distinction regarding where public aid was directed arose out of
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist.67  In
59. Id. at 615-16 (finding that the church schools were located close to the parish churches,
that there were religiously oriented extracurricular activities, and that two-thirds of the teachers
were nuns who strove to provide "an atmosphere in which religious instruction . . . [was]
natural").
60. Id. at 620-22. The Pennsylvania program required government surveillance to ensure
teachers did not espouse ideology in the classroom. Id. It similarly required the state to
distinguish costs of secular versus religious instruction for purposes of reimbursement. Id. at
620-21.
61. Id. at 620 ("This kind of state inspection and evaluation of... religious content ... is
fraught with the sort of entanglement that the Constitution forbids. It is ... pregnant with dangers
of excessive government direction of church schools and hence of churches. . . . [W]e cannot
ignore ... the danger that pervasive ... governmental power will ultimately intrude on religion
and thus conflict with the [Establishment Clause].").
62. Id.at621.
63. Id
64. Id. at 621-22.
65. Id. at 612-13 (establishing the three-pronged test as the principal means of resolving
Establishment Clause questions); see, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 250-51 (1977)
(relying on the Lemon test and, in particular, the primary effect prong); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S.
825, 832 (1973) (relying on the Lemon test and the law's primary effect of advancing religion);
Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 789-91 (1973) (relying on
the Lemon test and examining the direct-subsidy character of the aid in question).
66. See discussion infra Part I.B.l-2.
67. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 770-72; see also McClamrock, supra note 2, at 394-97 (tracing
the development of the Supreme Court's analytical emphasis on individual and institutional
benefit).
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Nyquist, the Court struck down portions of a New York statute that directed aid
to sectarian schools for maintenance and repair, and that also provided tuition
reimbursement to parents sending their children to those schools.68 The Court
found that, due to their direct-subsidy character and incentive to attend
religious schools, the provisions had the effect of advancing religion in
violation of the second prong of the Lemon test.
69
Similarly, in Wolman v. Walter, the Court struck down a statute providing
public expenditures for either nonpublic schools or the parents of students in
those schools, on the grounds that a portion of the aid supported the religious
aspects of the schools. The Court considered the fact that the public officials
administering the program were permitted statutorily to perform their functions
on the school grounds. It ultimately concluded that the statute had the
primary effect of supporting religious institutions, which violated the second
prong of the Lemon test.72
2. Permissible Direct-to-Student Aid Programs
Not all cases involving aid to nonpublic schools or their students result in
violations of the Establishment Clause. 3 As Mueller v. Allen demonstrates,
programs that benefit religiously affiliated institutions do not necessarily
74violate the Establishment Clause. In Mueller, the Supreme Court upheld a
state statute that permitted tax deductions for the costs of textbooks and other
68. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 762-64, 794. To have received aid for maintenance and repair, a
nonpublic, nonprofit school must have qualified under the statute by serving a large proportion of
students from low-income families. Id. at 762-63. Qualifying schools received a predefined
grant amount per pupil per year. Id. at 763. The tuition reimbursement was provided to parents
earning less than $5,000 in taxable income, with a reimbursement cap of fifty percent of the total
tuition bill. Id. at 764. Parents who did not qualify for tuition reimbursement were granted aid in
the form of tax credits per child attending a qualifying school. Id. at 765-66.
69. Id. at 789-94. The tuition reimbursement provision of the statute provided a greater
incentive for low-income families to send their children to nonpublic schools, because the
reimbursement was not proportionate to income. Id. at 790-91. Additionally, the reimbursement
was not reduced by any deductions already enjoyed by the taxpayer for charitable contributions to
religious institutions. Id. at 790.
70. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 248-51 (1977).
71. Id. at 248-49. The performance of the public officials' duties on the grounds of
religious schools contributed to the impression of inseparability of the secular and sectarian. Id.
at 250.
72. Id. at 250.
73. See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 3 (1993) (permitting a
school district to provide a sign-language interpreter for a deaf student at a Catholic high school);
Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 482 (1986) (allowing a state to
extend assistance under a vocational rehabilitation program to a blind student studying at a
Christian college); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390-91 (1983) (permitting Minnesota
taxpayers to deduct expenses incurred in providing education to their children).
74. Mueller. 463 U.S. at 390-92.
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required school supplies.75 The Court reasoned that the deduction did not have
76the effect of advancing religion, and it went on to state that "[t]he historic
purposes of the [Establishment] Clause simply do not encompass the sort of
attenuated financial benefit, ultimately controlled by the private choices of
individual parents, that eventually flows to parochial schools from the neutrally
available tax benefit at issue in this case."'77 Thus, students and their parents
were permitted to direct the public aid wherever they chose, making the
government's role permissibly neutral.78
The principle of neutrality articulated in Mueller proved critical in
successive cases, including Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District.79 In
Zobrest, the Court held that a program under the Individuals with Disabilities
Act (IDEA) that disbursed funds to provide an interpreter for a deaf student
attending a Catholic high school was permissible.80  The IDEA funds were
available to a broad class of citizens, regardless of whether religious
institutions would receive an indirect benefit. Thus, the Court reasoned, the
aid was neutral and, therefore, satisfied the effect prong of the Lemon test.
82
These cases illustrate the predominant factors once used by the Supreme
Court in considering Establishment Clause issues that arise from dispersing aid
to schools. 83  Additionally, they represent a fairly consistent, although
inchoate, span of jurisprudence. 84 Although the underlying principles have
since evolved, they remain highly relevant.
75. Id. at 391. The tax deduction was available to parents regardless of whether their
children attended public or nonpublic schools. Id. at 395-96. The Court noted that other
available tax deductions included those for medical expenses and charitable contributions, which
reflected the legislature's broad discretion to distribute the tax burden. Id. at 396.
76. Id. at 396-97.
77. Id. at 400.
78. Id. at 390-92, 400.
79. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1993).
80. Id. at 12-14. IDEA distributes aid to any "disabled" child, as defined under the statute,
without regard to the nature of the school attended. Id. at 10. Zobrest had received aid for an
interpreter throughout his years at a public middle school, and sought to continue receipt of that
aid upon his transfer to a Roman Catholic high school. Id. at 3-4.
81. Id. at 10.
82. Id. at 13-14. The principles of aid neutrality and private choice played a substantial role
in upholding the voucher program in Zelmon v. Simmons-Harris, despite the fact that most
participating parents chose to send their children to religious schools. 536 U.S. 639, 653-54
(2002). The Court reasoned that the program was permissible because it was part of a wide-
reaching undertaking to provide aid to children in a substandard school district, because no
reference to religion was made within the statute, and because there were no financial incentives
to attend parochial schools. Id.
83. See discussion supra Part I.B.1-2.
84. Id.
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C. Finding its Niche: The Court Continues to Shift Emphasis
In its application of the Lemon test, the Court consistently failed to find
evidence of excessive government entanglement with religious affairs; instead,
the Court relied on evidence of the advancement of religion.8 5 However, the
Court soon shifted its analytical focus and began to evaluate issues on the basis
of the Lemon test's third prong-the prohibition of excessive government
entanglement with religious affairs.8 6  Government relationships with some
religious institutions may broadcast an image of sponsorship, which further led
courts to specifically consider the nature of a school's degree of religiosity.8
7
1. Excessive Entanglement Becomes the Focal Point of Aid-to-Schools
Analysis
In New York v. Cathedral Academy, the Court considered a statute that
authorized reimbursement to nonpublic schools for both record keeping and
state-mandated testing services.8 8 Reasoning that "this sort of detailed inquiry
into the subtle implications of in-class examinations and other teaching
activities would itself constitute a significant encroachment on the protections
of the [Establishment Clause], 89 the Court held that the statute resulted in
excessive entanglement. 90 The Court relied on the fact that the state and the
religious institution would likely be forced to litigate, at least once, over which
school functions were religious in character. 9  Additionally, the services
funded by the aid created an inherent risk of religious indoctrination 92 because
the teachers rendering the required services were under the authority of the
sponsoring church.93
In understanding the application of this prong-described as necessarily one
of degrees94 -it is equally helpful to examine the Court's descriptions of what
is not excessive entanglement. In Roemer v. Board of Public Works, the Court
held that a state program offering annual grants to private colleges and
85. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 250-51 (1977) (finding advancement of religion);
Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 830-32 (1973) (finding advancement of religion); Comm. for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774 (1973) (finding advancement of
religion).
86. See discussion infra Part I.C. I.
87. See discussion infra Part I.C.2 (examining "pervasively sectarian" distinction).
88. New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 123, 126-27 (1977).
89. Id. at 132.
90. Id. at 133. The Court also found that the statute violated the effect prong of the Lemon
test. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 131.
93. Id.
94. See Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736, 766 (1976) ("There is no exact
science in gauging the entanglement of church and state. The wording of the test, which speaks
of 'excessive entanglement,' itself makes that clear. The relevant factors we have identified are to
be considered 'cumulatively' in judging the degree of entanglement.").
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universities would not result in such entanglement. 95  It reasoned that the
annual nature of the grants, in addition to the possibility of audits to verify that
the funds were used for sectarian functions, did not warrant a characterization
as excessive.
96
Similarly, in Bowen v. Kendrick, the Court refused to characterize certain
government monitoring as excessive entanglement. 97  In Bowen, the
government was required to oversee grants extended to, among other groups,
religious institutions that provided counseling services on teenage sexuality.
98
The Court characterized the monitoring as "less intensive" because the
government would not entangle itself in the day-to-day functions of the
religiously affiliated grantees. 9 The statute simply required review of the
grantees' proposed educational materials to ensure that they were of a secular
nature, with some additional review possibly taking place on the institutions'
premises.) ° The Court considered the meaning of excessive entanglement,
describing "extensive and permanent on-site monitoring" and intruding unduly
in the day-to-day operation of religiously affiliated institutions as examples of
an excessively entangled relationship.
101
2. Funding to a "Pervasively Sectarian " Institution is Deemed Excessive
Entanglement Per Se
As the use of Lemon's third prong grew increasingly prevalent, the Supreme
Court also began classifying schools by the degree and extent of their religious
functions. °2  The threshold degree of religious function, which requires an
institution to be "so permeated by religion that the secular side cannot be
95. Id. at 763-64. Institutions eligible for the annual grants must also have offered non-
religious degrees in addition to any seminarian or theological degrees. Id. at 740. The grants
were based upon the number of enrolled, full-time students, excluding those pursuing seminarian
or theological degrees. Id. Thus, the statutory provisions were themselves precautions against
the advancement of religion in the recipient schools. Id. at 740-41. Audits were conducted at the
discretion of the Council of Higher Education upon receipt of a report submitted by the recipient
institution identifying nonsectarian expenditures of the aid. Id. at 741-42.
96. Id. at 763-64.
97. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615-16 (1988).
98. Id. at 593-97.
99. Id. at 615-17. Although the organizations were not substantially focused on religious
missions, they were, no doubt, religious organizations. Id. at 597. The Court addressed this fact
by examining the statute's goal of recruiting a variety of organizations to help teenagers
understand sexuality. Id. at 604-05. The Court reasoned that the goal was a secular one, and
could not be invalidated simply because some of its approaches coincided with those of the
religious organizations. Id at 605.
100. Id.at6l6-17.
101. Id.
102. See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 746 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672,
680-81 (1971).
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separated from the sectarian,"' 10 3 served as a standard upon which courts could
rely in utilizing the inchoate Lemon test.1 4  The threshold classification of
"pervasively sectarian" became synonymous with impermissibility under the
Establishment Clause.'
0 5
The effect of being classified as a pervasively sectarian institution almost
certainly prevented receipt of public funds, either directly or indirectly.' 6 In
several opinions, the Supreme Court reasoned that the extension of aid to a
pervasively sectarian institution violated the second prong of the Lemon test.'
0 7
If the institutions' secular and sectarian activities were inseparable, the aid
necessarily had the effect of advancing religion.1 8 In Tilton v. Richardson,
however, the Court explicitly linked the third prong of the Lemon test to the
pervasively sectarian classification. 0 9  The Court explained that certain aid
programs required continued involvement with the aid recipient, and if this
recipient was pervasively sectarian, such involvement would constitute
excessive government entanglement with religion."l
0
103. Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736, 759 (1976) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
104. Id. at 758-59.
105. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985). The Court
explained its reliance on the "pervasively sectarian" distinction as it applies to the Establishment
Clause:
Given that 40 of the 41 schools in this case are thus "pervasively sectarian," the
challenged public school programs operating in the religious schools may
impermissibly advance religion in three different ways. First, the teachers participating
in the programs may become involved in intentionally or inadvertently inculcating
particular religious tenets or beliefs. Second, the programs may provide a crucial
symbolic link between government and religion, thereby enlisting-at least in the eyes
of impressionable youngsters-the powers of government to the support of the
religious denomination operating the school. Third, the programs may have the effect
of directly promoting religion by impermissibly providing a subsidy to the primary
religious mission of the institutions affected.
Id.; see also Hunt, 413 U.S. at 743-44; Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 301 F.3d 401, 407-09 (6th Cir.
2002).
106. See, e.g., Roemer, 426 U.S. at 758-60; Tilton, 403 U.S. at 687-88.
107. See, e.g., Roemer, 426 U.S. at 757-59; Tilton, 403 U.S. at 687-89.
108. See Roemer, 426 U.S. at 758-60. The Roemer Court noted, however, that if a
pervasively sectarian institution's secular activities could be separated from its sectarian
activities, then they alone could be permissibly funded. Id. at 755; see also Hunt v. McNair, 413
U.S. 734, 742-45 (1973).
109. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 687-89. The Court explained:
Since religious indoctrination is not a substantial purpose or activity of these church-
related colleges and universities, there is less likelihood than in primary and secondary
schools that religion will permeate the area of secular education. This reduces the risk
that government aid will in fact serve to support religious activities. Correspondingly,
the necessity for intensive government surveillance is diminished and the resulting
entanglements between government and religion lessened.
Id. at 687.
110. Id.at687-88.
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Continuing to demonstrate the weight it gave to the distinction between
sectarian and secular institutions, the Court in Roemer explicitly considered
whether the schools were pervasively sectarian, and ultimately concluded that
they were not.' The Court also noted in Bowen that the religiously affiliated
organizations being funded to provide counseling services were not
pervasively sectarian.112 Although the funding was ultimately upheld in both
cases,1 3 the most compelling line of analysis is the Court's willingness to
examine the religious nature of the institutions." 4
D. More Questions Than Answers: The State of the Law Following Mitchell v.
Helms and Locke v. Davey
Approximately ten years after Bowen, Supreme Court jurisprudence abruptly
changed course.' 15 For the first time, the Court recognized that it had
abandoned previous standards and confirmed its allegiance to neutrality as the
principle mode of analysis." 6 Reasoning that although the general principles
considered in Establishment Clause cases remained relevant, the Court's
"understanding of the criteria used to assess whether aid to religion has an
impermissible effect" had changed.' 7 The Court thus eliminated the informal
standard that direct subsidies necessarily had the effect of advancing religion in
violation of the second prong of the Lemon test.118  Instead, the Court
considered the manner in which the beneficiaries were identified and the lack
111. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 757-60.
112. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615-17 (1988). Oddly, the Court did not provide an
explanation for its determination that the funded organizations were not pervasively sectarian. Id.
113. See discussion supra Part I.C.1.
114. See Roemer, 426 U.S. at 755-60.
115. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 223 (1997) (explaining that the Court's
understanding of the criteria used to determine whether aid to religion has an impermissible effect
has changed because it abandoned the presumption that public teachers placed in parochial
schools will necessarily have the effect of advancing religion); see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530
U.S. 793, 829-36 (2000); infra notes 120-125 and accompanying text.
116. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 829-30 (holding that neutrally available aid in any form is
permissible under the Establishment Clause); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 223 (stating that the Court had
a new understanding of "whether aid to religion has an impermissible effect").
117. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 223. The Court explained that it had abandoned the presumption
that public school teachers placed in parochial schools will necessarily have the effect of
advancing religion. Id. at 223-24; see also Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1,
13-14 (1993) (abandoning the ban on placing a public employee in a sectarian school); Witters v.
Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488-89 (1986) (concluding that government
aid that directly assists the secular educational function of a sectarian school is not invalid per se);
Nat'l Coal. for Pub. Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Harris, 489 F. Supp. 1248, 1267-68 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (finding that no evidence of any attempt to advance religion by a public official on the
premises of a sectarian school existed).
118. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 225-26.
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of incentive for parents to change their religious practices or beliefs as a result
of the aid.119
Because the "pervasively sectarian" distinction held a place in the
Establishment Clause lexicon, the Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Helms was
faced with the task of squaring it with the new standard of neutrality. The
plurality in Mitchell overruled Wolman v. Walter,12 1 holding that neutrally
available aid, in any form, is permissible under the Establishment Clause. 122 In
his opinion, Justice Thomas reasoned that even if aid is provided to a sectarian
school, as long as it passed through the hands of private individuals who freely
forwarded it to that institution, the aid is not government advancement of
religion. 123  Casting doubt onto the distinction, Justice Thomas further
explained that the Establishment Clause does not "require[] the exclusion of
pervasively sectarian schools from otherwise permissible aid programs,"
124
confirming the Court's new focus on neutrality and private choice.
' 2
Less than four years later, the Court displayed further adherence to the
neutrality standard in Locke v. Davey.126 In Locke, the Court considered a state
119. See id at 230-32. Here, the aid was equally available to sectarian and secular
institutions on a nondiscriminatory basis that neither favored nor disfavored religion. Id. at 209-
10. Cf Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10 (upholding aid program because there was no financial incentive
for parents to send their disabled children to a religious school); Witters, 474 U.S. at 488
(upholding aid program because no financial incentive was created to attend religious schools).
120. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 829-36.
121. Id. at 808. Finding that the aid program neither resulted in religious indoctrination nor
granted aid with a bias toward or against religion, the Court "acknowledge[d that] ... Wolman [is
an] anomal[y] in [Supreme Court] case law." Id.
122. Id. at 829-35.
123. Id. at 817-20 (reasoning that the direct-indirect distinction between aid programs is an
arbitrary distinction, and that what is of constitutional concern is whether the use of aid for
indoctrination can be directly attributed to the government).
124. Id at 829. The Court left unresolved the issue of whether a state could exclude
pervasively sectarian institutions. But see Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1250
(10th Cir. 2008) (holding that Colorado could not exclude pervasively sectarian institutions from
state scholarship programs).
125. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 829. Justice Thomas indicated further change in Mitchell by
noting that the excessive entanglement prong of the Lemon test was to be combined with the
effect prong. Id. at 807-08. Thus, excessive entanglement would be an element considered when
determining whether the effect of a statute was to either advance or inhibit religion. Id; see also
Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, The Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty:
Avoiding the Extremes But Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REv. 155, 170 (2004) (interpreting
case law as holding that as long as there is substantial secular content in the funded program, it is
of no consequence how religious the individual's choice is).
126. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 715 (2004) (holding that even students attending schools
with a substantial religious character could receive aid as long as they did not pursue theological
or devotional degrees). Cf McClamrock, supra note 2, at 383 (arguing that although
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been at times inconsistent, the Supreme Court has
consistently relied on two principles of interpretation: (1) neutrality toward religion and (2)
separation of church and state). But see Laycock, supra note 125, at 168-69 (arguing that the
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statutory scheme that granted scholarships to students attending eligible
universities, but excluded students majoring in devotional or theological
fields.127  The Court upheld the program, reasoning that the state has a
legitimate and historically recognized interest in not funding the ministry.
128
The case highlighted the "play in the joints" regarding what a state may
permissibly prohibit under the Establishment Clause, despite not being
required to do so.' 29 The decision is significant because, for the first time, the
Supreme Court explicitly stated that religious discrimination is permissible in
some circumstances.' 30  Notably, the Court observed that the university at
which the student intended to study had a substantial religious character.'3
The Court did not employ the term "pervasively sectarian" and upheld the
program, despite the result of permitting indirect funding to go to a
substantially religious school. 132 Thus, Locke v. Davey highlights the disfavor
of the "pervasively sectarian" distinction and its dwindling significance with
respect to the permissibility of public aid. 133  Nonetheless, the case
demonstrates the need to examine the degree to which religion permeates
facets of a university's academic culture to ensure that public funding is
permissibly applied.
134
Despite its disfavor, the "pervasively sectarian" distinction, as interpreted by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, remains a relevant
tool in analyzing programs that direct public aid to religiously affiliated
schools. 135  The Tenth Circuit, however, considers the distinction
theological instruction should have been funded because the aid would have been the result of the
private individual's choice).
127. Locke, 540 U.S. at 715. Colleges and universities offering devotional or theological
degrees were not excluded from the program; instead, only the students pursuing those degrees
were excluded. Id. at 715-16. Students could permissibly pursue non-devotional degrees at
institutions that did, nonetheless, offer those degrees. Id.
128. Id. at 715, 722.
129. Id. at 718-19 (internal quotation marks omitted).
130. Id. The state of Free Exercise law following the decision creates a distinction between
the levels of scrutiny to be used in those claims. See supra note 25. Rather than analyzing a
statute as presumptively unconstitutional and applying strict scrutiny, when a statute creates a
benefit based upon religious practice but does not require an all-or-nothing choice between freely
practicing one's religion and receiving a benefit, rational basis is the proper test. See infra note
167. As subsequently interpreted, aid may be precluded without violating the First Amendment's
Religion Clauses, and a definite line may be drawn as to what exactly may be precluded. See
Bush v. Holmes, 886 So.2d 340, 360-61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); see also Laycock, supra note
125, at 213-18 (analyzing the significance of Locke v. Davey and concluding that the scholarships
should have been permitted to fund theological instruction).




135. See Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd. of Nashville, 301 F.3d 401, 403 (6th Cir. 2002); Johnson
v. Econ. Dev. Corp. of Oakland, 241 F.3d 501, 510 (6th Cir. 2001). The Sixth Circuit described
its understanding of the role of precedent in interpreting the Establishment Clause and the
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irrelevant. 136 The Tenth Circuit has instead focused upon the secular purposes
and neutrality of aid programs, 37 going so far as to hold the secular-sectarian
distinction unconstitutional. 138  Most significantly, the Tenth Circuit has
deemed the inquiry used to make the "pervasively sectarian" distinction an
excessively entangling tool. 139 In effect, the court considers the inquiry an
inhibition of religion and has expanded the definition of excessive
entanglement to preclude states from examining the religious character of
institutions as a condition of receiving state aid.
140
II. ENTER COLORADO CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY: TESTING THE WATERS AFTER
LOCKE
A. CCU Claims Eligibility for the Receipt of State Scholarship Monies
Colorado, in addition to subsidizing education at public institutions of higher
education, offers scholarships to in-state students attending eligible private
institutions within the state. 14 1  The relevant authorizing statutes define
scholarship eligibility as attendance at any institution of higher education,
excluding those deemed pervasively sectarian by the state. 142 A college or
university will not be deemed pervasively sectarian if it demonstrates that:
(a) The faculty and students are not exclusively of one religious
persuasion. (b) There is no required attendance at religious
convocations or services. (c) There is a strong commitment to
principles of academic freedom. (d) There are no required courses in
religion or theology that tend to indoctrinate or proselytize. (e) The
governing board does not reflect nor is the membership limited to
pervasively sectarian distinction with regard to aid to institutions. Johnson, 241 F.3d at 510 n.2.
Judge Clay stated that it was Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Mitchell-which did not
abolish the "pervasively sectarian" distinction-that bound the Court. Id. He wrote that pursuant
to the principle that when the Supreme Court issues a plurality opinion, the "holding of [the]
Court is that of those Members who concurred in [the] judgment on [the] narrowest grounds." Id.
(citing Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 957 (6th Cir. 2000)).
136. See Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1261 (10th Cir. 2008).
137. Id. at 1259-60.
138. Id. at 1268-69 (holding the pervasively sectarian distinction unconstitutional on the
basis that it was discrimination among religions).
139. Id. at 1261.
140. Id. at 1261-62.
141. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 23-3.3-102, 23-3.3-701, 23-3.5-101, 23-3.7-101, 23-18-102
(2008); Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1250. Eligible institutions under the statute were
defined as "any accredited college in the state-public or private, secular or religious-other than
those the state deems 'pervasively sectarian."' Id.
142. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 23-3.3-102, 23-3.3-701, 23-3.5-101, 23-3.7-101, 23-18-102
(2008); Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1250.
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persons of any particular religion. (f) Funds do not come primarily
or predominantly from sources advocating a particular religion.
143
Colorado Christian University (CCU) is located in Lakewood, Colorado.
144
It is a private, accredited university.14 5 that purports to provide education
"framed by a Christian world view." 4 According to university data, ninety-
nine percent of its two thousand students adhere to the Christian faith in one of
its many denominations.
147
All students are required to sign a "Lifestyle Covenant Agreement"-a
promise to model their conduct on "the example of Jesus Christ and the
teachings of the Bible."' 148  Non-adult undergraduate students must attend a
weekly chapel service or face remedial consequences. 49  CCU requires
twenty-six courses for undergraduate students, four of which are either
theology- or Biblical-based.150
Unlike students, faculty and trustees of the University are required to sign a
statement that affirms their belief in the University's religious creed, including,
in part: "[T]he Bible as the infallible Word of God, the existence of God in the
Father, Son and Holy Spirit, the divinity of Jesus Christ, and principles of
salvation, present ministry, resurrection, and the spiritual unity of believers in
143. COLO. REv. STAT. § 23-3.5-105(1) (2008). It was unclear how many of the factors
needed to be violated before an institution was deemed pervasively sectarian. See Colo. Christian
Univ., 534 F.3d at 1251 (noting that the record was confusing on this point). The Colorado
Commission on Higher Education's financial aid officer testified that failing four of the six
elements would classify an institution as pervasively sectarian; however, the chief financial
officer testified that only failing all six would result in the classification. Id.
144. Id. at 1252.
145. Id. CCU is accredited by the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools
(NCACS), a nongovernmental regional accreditation agency. Regional accreditation applies to an
institution as a whole. See WILLIAM A. KAPLIN & BARBARA LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER
EDUCATION 1530-34. See generally CREATING THE COUNCIL FOR HIGHER EDUCATION
ACCREDITATION (Harland Bloland ed., 2001) (explaining the origins of the NCACS and other
Regional Accrediting Associations). Colleges and universities voluntarily seek accreditation due
to public reliance on those agencies' decisions whether to grant accreditation. See KAPL1N &
LEE, supra, at 1531-32. Some states, including Colorado, include accreditation as a requisite
credential for being included in funding programs. Id.; see also Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d
at 1250. Accreditation agencies, however, may not properly monitor important aspects of
institutions in which a state may have an interest, including nondiscrimination and academic
freedom. KAPLIN & LEE, supra, at 1532-34. An accreditation agency may not fulfill the
necessary role in evaluating whether a university is so permeated with religion that providing
state funding would violate the Establishment Clause. See infra note 218. Thus, states must be
permitted to make the necessary inquiries into an institution's religious character.
146. Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1252 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
147. Id.
148. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
149. Id. Students who miss chapel service must pay a fine, watch a recording of the service,
or attend classes that meet the chapel requirement. Id.
150. Id.
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our Lord Jesus Christ. ' 5 1 The statement explains itself as an adherence to a
"broad, historic evangelical faith," and the framework within which students
and faculty engage in study and academic discourse.'
52
CCU submitted its application to participate in Colorado's scholarship
programs in September 2003, claiming that it met the criteria listed in the
scholarships' enabling statutes.' 53  The Colorado Commission on Higher
Education's Financial Aid Officer responded to CCU's application in February
2004.154 She requested syllabi for the theology courses offered by CCU and
inquired into the religious beliefs of the faculty, students, and trustees.'
55
Although they found the inquiry "patently unconstitutional," CCU complied
with the request.'
56
The Commission reviewed the requested information and concluded that: (1)
the theology courses did tend to indoctrinate or proselytize; (2) CCU's board
of trustees did reflect or was limited to a single religion; and (3) CCU did
require attendance at religious convocations or services.
15 7
Following the determination, and after a meeting with the Commission,
CCU filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado.158 In that suit, CCU alleged that the state of Colorado had violated
the Establishment, Free Exercise, and Equal Protection Clauses.' 59 The district
court granted summary judgment for the state of Colorado. 16  CCU appealed
the decision and asserted that Colorado's use of the "pervasively sectarian"
distinction violated the U.S. Constitution.
6 1
B. The Tenth Circuit Strikes Down the "Pervasively Sectarian " Test
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, with instructions to the
district court to enter summary judgment in favor of CCU.1 62 The court held
151. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
152. Id. The statement's premise is that the pursuit of knowledge is an inquiry into God's
revelation of knowledge using all academic disciplines. Id. Although the university has adopted
the "1940 Statement of Principles of Academic Freedom of the American Association of
University Professors," it is subject to the statement of faith. Id.
153. Id.; COLO. REV. STAT. § 23-3.5-105(1) (2008) (listing the criteria necessary to avoid
being labeled pervasively sectarian).
154. Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1252.
155. Id. at 1252-53.






162. Id. at 1250. The state of Colorado announced that it would not appeal the Tenth
Circuit's decision. Press Release, Colorado Commission on Higher Education, No CCHE Appeal
of Court Decision for Colorado Christian U (Aug. 1, 2008) (on file with author), available at
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that the state of Colorado may not choose to exclude pervasively sectarian
institutions-as defined by state law-even though such action is not required
by the U.S. Constitution.' 63 The court struck down the "pervasively sectarian"
distinction as unconstitutional discrimination among religions., 64  The court
also found the inquiry into the school's "religious views" overly intrusive,
constituting "excessive entanglement."
'1 65
In so holding, the court clarified its application of the Supreme Court's
decision in Locke v. Davey.166  The Tenth Circuit construed Locke as
precluding the states' ability to freely discriminate in the funding of religious
institutions. 167 This clarification affirmed the principles espoused and relied
upon by the Supreme Court to determine the permissibility of state aid,
including neutrality of funding and the free choice of individuals.' 
68
At issue in this Note is the Tenth Circuit's striking down of the "pervasively
sectarian" inquiry, which it characterized as a set of impermissible, intrusive
http://www.ago.state.co.us/pressreleases/CCU%20Decision.pdf. Thus, the question, as
presented in Colorado Christian University, will not enjoy further review.
163. Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1253.
164. Id. at 1258.
165. Id. at 1261.
166. Id. at 1254-55.
167. Id. The Tenth Circuit's interpretation of Locke stands in direct contrast to the district
court's interpretation, which concluded that under Locke,
[n]on-neutral statutes that do not: (i) impose criminal nor civil sanctions on any
religious service or rite; (ii) do not deprive religious observers of "the right to
participate in the political affairs of the community"; (iii) do not "require students to
choose between their religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit"; and (iv)
simply reflect a governmental decision "not to fund a distinct category of instruction,"
are not presumptively unconstitutional, and thus are subject only to rational basis
scrutiny.
Colo. Christian Univ. v. Baker, No. 04-cv-02512-MSK-BNB, 2007 WL 1489801, at *5 (D. Colo.
May 18, 2007) (citing Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720-21 (2004)). The district court found
the case to be factually similar to Locke, in that CCU-as an uncontested pervasively sectarian
institution-provided instruction similar to the theological instruction at issue in Locke, and that
the aid scheme here did not force students to choose between religion and education. Id. at *5-5.
The district court went on to apply the Locke analytical framework and found that Colorado had a
legitimate interest in not funding religion, and that the scholarship statutes were reasonably
related to that end, thus passing the rational basis review required by the Free Exercise claim. Id.
at *8. The district court did, however, apply strict scrutiny to CCU's Establishment Clause claim
per its interpretation of Larson v. Valente, which requires such scrutiny when examining statutes
that differentiate among sectarian institutions. Id. at *13. The court found that Colorado's
scholarship statutes passed that test as well, because Colorado's interest in not funding
pervasively sectarian institutions was compelling, and the pervasively sectarian distinction served
to advance that interest. Id. at * 14-15. The court addressed the holding of Americans United for
Separation of Church and State v. Colorado, 648 P.2d 1072 (Colo. 1982), which prohibited the
exclusion of sectarian institutions from state funding, but refused to extend the holding of that
case to pervasively sectarian institutions. Id. at *6-7.
168. Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1254-55; see also Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228,
246 (1982) (requiring a strict scrutiny analysis of government action that discriminates among
religions).
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judgments of religion by the state, in violation of the prohibition of excessive
government entanglement with religion. 169 This characterization redefines the
criteria for government entanglement to qualify as excessive, and ignores the
necessity of examining the religious functions of a university to ensure public
funding is constitutionally applied. 7 ' Additionally, the court does not provide
an alternative, permissible method by which a state may determine whether its
funding is in accordance with the Establishment Clause.17' The holding
necessarily requires the state to rely on determinations made by
nongovernmental accreditation boards and universities' self-evaluations,
without the ability to analyze those claims.
172
III. THE TENTH CIRCUIT IMPROPERLY REDEFINED EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT
TO PROHIBIT THE EXAMINATION OF UNIVERSITIES' RELIGIOUS CHARACTER
The relevant prior law conveys a pattern of Establishment Clause
interpretation 173 and provides an adequate guide for confronting school aid
cases. The Supreme Court has demonstrated that states must have a way of
determining compliance with the Clause-neither advancing nor inhibiting
religion. Therefore, courts have never read the excessive entanglement prong
to restrict a state's ability to adhere to the Clause, but rather as a tool for
measuring aid and ensuring adherence to the Clause.
174
In Colorado Christian University v. Weaver, the Tenth Circuit improperly
expanded the concept of excessive entanglement to include Colorado's inquiry
into universities' religious activities. 75 The court instead should have relied
upon the principles espoused by the Supreme Court and simply held that the
"pervasively sectarian" distinction is unconstitutional. Further, the decision
raises the question of what constitutes a permissible inquiry into a school's
religious affairs for the purpose of adhering to the Establishment Clause, 176 and
sends the message that schools may assert any claim that is necessary to
receive state funding, regardless of the degree to which they actually advance
religion.
169. Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1261-66.
170. Id No longer is physical presence of government through supervision, auditing, or
other means necessary for excessive entanglement to be found. Id.
171. Id.
172. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
173. See discussion supra Part I.D; see also McClamrock, supra note 2, at 383 (arguing that
the Supreme Court has consistently relied on two principles of interpretation: (1) neutrality
toward religion and (2) separation of church and state).
174. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971) (discussing the requirements of the
excessive entanglement prong).
175. See Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1261-62 (evaluating CCU's religious education
curriculum).
176. Id. at 1266. The court admits that a state may conceivably have an interest in
prohibiting aid to a religious institution, but goes no further in explaining what that interest may
entail or how to define its constitutionality. Id. at 1261.
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A. Straying from Precedent
The Tenth Circuit's decision to strike down the "pervasively sectarian"
distinction as unconstitutional is grounded in Supreme Court precedent.1
77
Although the Sixth Circuit applied the same precedent differently, 178 the
Supreme Court's distaste with the distinction is well documented.179  In
Mitchell v. Helms, Justice Thomas wrote for a plurality, asserting that the era
during which the "pervasively sectarian" distinction was relevant or applicable
had passed.' Although not expressly struck down, the Supreme Court has not
employed the distinction or applied the underlying concepts in recent cases... .. 181
concerning government aid to religiously affiliated schools. Instead, it has
relied on other concepts, including the neutrality of available aid and the free
choice of private individuals. 82 The Court has, however, consistently
employed the concept of excessive entanglement as a means of gauging states'
compliance with the Establishment Clause.'
8 3
In Colorado Christian University, the Commission's inquiry involved a one-
time examination of certain religious characteristics of the school. 84 Thesefacts are distinguishable from the facts analyzed by the Supreme Court in
177. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000) (stating that the pervasively sectarian
inquiry is offensive and unnecessary); see also Klint Alexander, The Road to Vouchers: The
Supreme Court's Compliance and the Crumbling of the Wall of Separation Between Church and
State in American Education, 92 KY. L.J. 439, 481 (2004) (concluding that "the wall of
separation between church and state" in governmental school aid cases has all but disappeared);
Court Ruling is Victory for Religious Colleges, supra note 8 ("The ruling is the latest in a series of
potentially fatal blows to three decades of legal doctrine that has distinguished between
religiously connected colleges .... ).
178. See Johnson v. Econ. Dev. Corp. of Oakland, 241 F.3d 501, 510 n.2 (6th Cir. 2001);
supra note 135.
179. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828; Johnson, 241 F.3d at 510 (detailing the current status of
the pervasively sectarian distinction).
180. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828-29.
181. See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 724-25 (2004) (relying instead on the religious
character of the academic degree sought).
182. See, e.g., Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487-89 (1986)
(holding that a blind college student otherwise eligible for state educational funding may not be
denied such funding simply because he would direct it to a religious school); see also
McClamrock, supra note 2, at 382-83 (arguing that the Establishment Clause permits government
funding of students attending pervasively sectarian schools following Witters); Megan E. Bovee,
Robert C. Goettling & Paul F. Ritter, Comment, Witters v. Washington Department of Services
for the Blind: The Establishment Clause and Financial Aid to Students for Religious Education at
Private Institutions, 13 J.C. & U.L. 397, 397 (1987) (suggesting that a decision denying funds in
Witters would have inhibited religion). The authors conclude that following Witters, there is a
developing, cooperative relationship between state government and private institutions of higher
education. Id. at 406.
183. See discussion supra Part I.C. 1-2.
184. See Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1261-62 (10th Cir. 2008)
(discussing the commission's examination of syllabi from theology courses).
1188 [Vol. 58:1165
2009] Excessive Entanglement: The Tenth Circuit's Improper Redefinition 1189
Agostini and Bowen, in that no "pervasive monitoring" was required. 18 5 In
fact, the Court would classify pervasive monitoring as indicative of excessive
entanglement.' 86 Also, the Commission's review of CCU's class syllabi as
evidence of the indoctrination of students 18 7 is similar to the federal
government's review of educational materials to determine religiosity in
Bowen. 188 However, the federal government's review at issue in Bowen was
not deemed excessive,' s9 whereas Colorado's was determined to be excessive
entanglement. 190 The Tenth Circuit emphasized that the state would be forced
to second-guess and make judgments about religious matters.' 9' Although this
is a legitimate concern, it must be considered in light of its one-time nature.
The court's decision in Colorado Christian University ignores the examples
offered in Agostini and Bowen. The Tenth Circuit has reduced the degree of
entanglement required in order to classify government involvement as
excessive. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit should have refrained from
examining the "pervasively sectarian" inquiry, and instead strictly focused on
allowing aid under the Colorado scholarship statutes to flow to CCU. Had the
court in this case relied on the authoritative principles espoused by the
Supreme Court, its decision would be firmly backed by precedent. 19 2 Instead,
the Tenth Circuit's striking down of the pervasively sectarian inquiry
improperly expanded the concept of excessive entanglement and will inhibit
states from complying with the Establishment Clause.,93
B. Denying States an Effective Gauge
Earlier Supreme Court cases concerning both permissible and impermissible
forms of aid provide a standard, guide, or test for states to rely upon when
185. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997) (finding that pervasive monitoring of Title
I teachers is not required); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 616 (1988) (advancing less
intensive monitoring methods for grants).
186. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233; Bowen, 487 U.S. at 616.
187. See Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1261-62.
188. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 616-18.
189. Id.
190. Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1261-62.
191. Id. at 1263. The court relied on New York v. Cathedral Academy in making this
assertion, stating that such litigation touches the core of the meaning of the Establishment Clause.
Id. at 1262. However, Cathedral Academy involved an aid program that required the state and the
religious institution to litigate over religious matters. Id. Here, the state was permitted to make
determinations of religious matters without being forced to litigate their legitimacy in court. Id.
192. See supra note 179.
193. Courts have consistently adapted the concept of excessive entanglement to new
circumstances and considered it in light of other conditions. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203, 222-23 (1997); Bowen, 487 U.S. at 616-17. However, they have adapted it in a manner
consistent with its purpose, not as a means to eliminate state inquiry. Id.
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exercising their discretion to dole out aid to religiously affiliated schools.
1 94
The Tenth Circuit's decision to strike down Colorado's "pervasively sectarian"
inquiry leaves no workable standard upon which states and lower courts can
rely. Further, it prohibits effective state inquiry or review, thus forcing states
to rely upon accreditation credentials and schools' self-reporting of their
religious character. 195 The decision improperly leaves states without a way to
gauge their compliance with the Clause.
1. What is a Permissible Inquiry?
The Tenth Circuit classified the Commission's "pervasively sectarian"• • • . 196
inquiry as excessive entanglement, and struck the inquiry in its entirety,
without suggesting alternative ways for the state to seek information.' 97 States
have a historically significant and constitutionally mandated interest in
complying with the Establishment Clause. 198 Accordingly, states must have a
way to gauge their compliance and make inquiries of religiously affiliated
institutions to ensure that public funds are not advancing religion.
The Su p reme Court has devised several ways to analyze compliance with the
Clause. 19' Lemon v. Kurtzman, for example, provided the three-pronged
200
Lemon test, which has been employed by courts for over three decades.
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist also offers a
material factor to be considered when examining aid programs: whether there
is any resulting incentive to attend religious schools because of the nature of
the aid.20 1 Bowen v. Kendrick provides an additional factor strongly associated
with a state's discretion to offer aid: whether a religious institution has an
202explicitly religious mission. These cases demonstrate the Supreme Court's
habit of elucidating factors and tests to which governments and lower courts
can look for guidance.
20 3
194. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 674-75 (1970) (examining the
extent of government entanglement with religion); Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. I v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) (discussing the purpose and effect of a New York aid statute).
195. See THE HIGHER LEARNING COMMISSION, INSTITUTIONAL ACCREDITATION: AN
OVERVIEW 1, available at http://ncahlc.org/download/overview07.pdf (discussing the process of
educational accreditation from nongovernmental bodies).
196. Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1250.
197. Id. at 1262-66.
198. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 722 (2004).
199. See discussion supra Part 1.C.1-2 (explaining the tests and analyses the Supreme Court
has employed).
200. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); see also Roemer v. Bd. of Pub.
Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736, 744-45, 748 (1976) (applying the Lemon test).
201. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 785-87 (1973).
202. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 609-10 (1988).
203. See discussion supra Part I.C.1-2 (explaining the tests and analyses the Supreme Court
has employed).
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The Tenth Circuit, however, declared the appropriate inquiry to be excessive
entanglement without explaining where a line should be drawn in such
inquiries.204  The court merely mentioned the necessity that a state employ
"neutral, objective criteria., 2 5 This holding provides little guidance for the
state of Colorado, and other states within the Tenth Circuit's jurisdiction, to
rely upon when drafting aid schemes .2 6
2. State Review is Precluded
Colorado has an undisputed interest in not advancing religion, which
includes funding a student's study for the minist. 207  An institution
08
professing adherence to the Evangelical Christian faith 2° may raise concerns
about the education it provides and its similarity to devotional or ministerial
education. 209  In its holding in Colorado Christian University, the Tenth
Circuit did not define what programs or institutions Colorado may permissibly
210fund °. Consequently, Colorado is left without guidance as to what it can
constitutionally do to ensure that a religiously affiliated institution of higher
education is reporting accurately on applications to the scholarship program.
CCU advertises itself to prospective students as a university that will
strengthen their Christian faith and frame their academic experience within
204. Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1266 (10th Cir. 2008).
205. Id.
206. See id. (failing to provide the state with an alternative set of criteria).
207. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721-22 (2004) (explaining that the state's anti-
establishment interest is nowhere more relevant than in situations concerning public funding of
the ministry).
208. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 432 (Eleventh ed. 2003). The
term "evangelical" is defined as:
1: of, relating to, or being in agreement with the Christian gospel esp. as it is presented
in the four Gospels ... 3: emphasizing salvation by faith in the atoning death of Jesus
Christ through personal conversion, the authority of Scripture, and the importance of
preaching as contrasted with ritual ... 5: marked by militant or crusading zeal.
Id.; see also ANDY G. OLREE, THE CHOICE PRINCIPAL: THE BIBLICAL CASE FOR LEGAL
TOLERATION vii (2006). The author describes Evangelical Christians as those who believe in the
"supreme authority of the Bible in all human affairs" and who "spread the truth [found in Biblical
scripture] to others because truth matters." Id. at vii-viii. The author goes on to assert that
evangelicals are "call[ed] to political action" against abortion, euthanasia, homosexual marriage,
and teenage pregnancy. Id. at viii. It is reasonable to suspect that CCU, which advertises itself as
adhering to these values, uses the academic experience it offers to further these objectives. It is
therefore necessary for Colorado to be permitted to make the necessary inquiry of CCU's
religious functions to ensure the Establishment Clause is not violated by allowing public funds to
be directed to CCU.
209. See Locke, 540 U.S. at 725 (holding that states have a legitimate interest in not funding
devotional or ministerial education and may choose to abstain from doing so); supra notes 126-
133 and accompanying text.
210. Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1266 (explaining only that "neutral, objective
criteria" must be used in determining whether an activity may be funded).
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211those bounds. On its application for admission to Colorado's scholarship
program, however, CCU reported that its courses do not indoctrinate or
212proselytize, and that its students are not limited to one religious faith. There
is a clear discrepancy between CCU's mission and its report to the
Commission, and Colorado is left without a mechanism with which to
investigate that discrepancy. 213 As such, the Tenth Circuit's holding sends an
important policy message regarding a state's authority to control the funding of
religiously affiliated institutions, particularly those of higher education.
Although the court noted otherwise, the holding sends the message that
religiously affiliated institutions may decide for themselves whether they are
eligible to receive state aid, either directly or indirectly.2 14 CCU purports to
embrace Evangelical Christianity and frame its education and academic
discourse within those bounds.2 15 Its faculty are required to sign a statement of
adherence to the university's beliefs, and a sizeable demographic of its student
body is required to attend chapel services.2 16 These characteristics strongly
217
imply that the offered education is religious in nature. However, by barring
Colorado's inquiry into the degree of this religiosity, the state is effectively
required to rely upon non-government accreditation procedures and, most
importantly, CCU's self-evaluation and responses on the scholarship
application. 218 The message is sent that an institution may make the claims
necessary to receive the benefits of government aid, as those claims are not
subject to meaningful state review.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although Establishment Clause jurisprudence has proven to be an evolving
body of law, its early evolution was deliberate, gradated, and gradual. It
served as a useful guide for courts considering novel issues and providing
logical standards upon which they could rely in the interim. The Tenth
Circuit's holding in Colorado Christian University v. Weaver, however,
211. Id. at 1252;see also supra note 208.
212. See Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1252.
213. See discussion supra Part II.A.
214. Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1266.
215. Id. at 1252.
216. Id.
217. See supra notes 148-152, 208 and accompanying text.
218. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 23-3.3-101(3)(b), 23-3.5-102(3)(a)(11) (requiring an
"institution of higher education" to be accredited); 23-3.7-102(3)(c), 23-18-102(9) (2008); Colo.
Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1250; supra note 145; see also THE HIGHER LEARNING
COMMISSION, supra note 195, at 5-7. The Commission lists the criteria it uses as a basis for
accreditation. Id. Criteria related to degree of religiosity, religious functions, or religious
requirements are not listed. Id. Thus, the accreditation process does not take into account all
interests of the state. The state must be permitted to supplement the accreditation inquiry to
ensure any public aid directed to a college or university is not in violation of the Establishment
Clause.
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departs from the logic of its predecessors and, instead, leaves the law unclear.
This uncertainty has serious ramifications for the states' ability to adhere to the
Establishment Clause's requirement of neutrality toward religion and
prohibition of religious sponsorship.
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